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1 Introduction
Why do rich counries seem to much more concerned with stability in oil-
producing countries than poor countries? Can they credibly commit them-
selves to actions that guarantee peace? Or can they only commit to actions
that in fact increase the extent of conflicts? These are among the questions
that we study in the paper. Among the results we provide a new explana-
tion for one of the major results in the recent empirical research on conflicts:
there is a non-linear relationship between income per capita and probability
of conflicts, at low levels of income the probability is high, but the probabil-
ity begins to decline when income increases (Collier et. al. 2003). Here the
explanation is that incentives for countries outside the conflict to provide
help in peace-keeping are credible only if the conflicting regions/countries
have high enough income.
We extend the basic international trade and conflict model by Haa-
paranta and Kuisma (2005) and Becsi and Lahiri (2005) to analyze the
role of peace-building by outside countries in local conflicts in developing
countries1. This is an important question as most wars nowadays are in-
trastate and take place in the third world, thus significantly weakening their
already poor growth prospects. In this paper we find that if peace-building
is taken into account, the intensity of conflicts can decline when the con-
flict country’s income increases (which is consistent with empirical evidence
as pointed out above). This paper also argues that incomplete pre-conflict
peace-building operations will in fact increase military buildup. In contrast,
successful pre-conflict peace-building requires that the outside countries are
suﬃciently rich, and that the conflicting countries have a high enough in-
come as well (which conforms with the existing empirical evidence). Finally,
it turns out that post-conflict operations are time-consistent only if the out-
side country is suﬃciently rich. On the other hand, repairing war damages
1See also Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996; 2001)
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is counterproductive, because it increases military investments. To the best
of our knowledge these results are new in the economic research of conflicts.
Traditionally, conflicts and civil wars have been assumed to have their
roots in political, geographical or religious issues and/or inequality among
diﬀerent groups, i.e. the so called "grievance-approach"2. Recently, however,
a growing interest has emerged to also examine the economic aspects of con-
flicts. It is clear that conflicts have enormous economic consequences, in par-
ticular for countries already poor, as hostilities destroy scarce resources and
convert funding away from productive uses3. Conflicts also have many other
indirect channels through which they significantly reduce growth prospects.
For example, conflicts have negative eﬀects on financial development (Addi-
son et al., 2004), they destroy social capital (Colletta and Cullen, 2000) and
significantly reduce tourism (Dhariwal, 2004) to mention only a few. Brück
(2001) gives an account of the impacts of the civil war on the post-war
Mozambican economy.
The literature on the economics of conflict has proposed that, in addition
to their economic consequences, conflicts can have economic causes, and that
conflicts may at least partly be a result of greed instead of grievances4. It is
noteworthy that grievances have an economic dimension, too. For example,
we can think of the economic consequences of discrimination and inter-group
2See for example Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001) for discussion of the diﬀerent motives
for rebellion. On the implications of inequality, see also Stewart (2002), who focuses on
horizontal inequality as a source of political instability. Yet another view of inequality is
presented by Dutta and Mischra (2003) who propose that anticipated future inequality
(which has to be significant), in particular, is an important factor in generating conflict.
3On the costs of conflicts see for example new results by Pottebaum and Kanbur (2004).
See also Collier et al. (2003).
4On the economics of conflict in developing countries, see for example Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2001), Collier (2000) and Collier et al. (2003). On the economics of conflict
in general, see example Sandler and Hartley (1995) for a thorough survey and Grossman
(1991) as an introduction of modelling conflicts in economics.
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inequalities. Furthermore, the role of trade in conflicts5 has received atten-
tion. While it is an accepted fact that conflicts do have economic aspects,
the importance of these is a matter of debate. In a nutshell, economists tend
to emphasize the role of economic factors, while other scholars focus more
on sociological, religious and other non-economic aspects6. In the economics
literature a high incidence of conflicts has been associated with low income
and slow growth rate, and heavy reliance on primary commodities. The lat-
ter eﬀect emerges as nonlinear, first increasing and peaking when the share
of primary commodity exports approaches to 30 percent of GDP. (Collier et
al. 2003)7.
Even though the fundamental causes for conflicts are somewhat debat-
able, it is a fact that conflicts and civil wars are extremely detrimental for
development. The consequences of a (often long lasting) civil war can be
disastrous both to the population of the country in war and internationally.
It is clear that civil war not only aﬀects the countries at war, but also has
serious spillover eﬀects on neighboring countries and to the international
community8. It is becoming increasingly recognized that intrastate wars
demand action from outside countries. As has been proposed in research,
trade can be an indirect means of aﬀectinf the situation in conflict-prone
countries, even though the role of trade in mitigating conflicts is somewhat
controversial9. A direct means of influencing the incidence and duration of
5See e.g. Polachek (1997), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001), Mc Donald (2004) and
Haaparanta and Kuisma (2005)
6The ongoing discussion is reviewed in Malone and Nitzschke (2004)
7Nafziger (2004) lists the following factors (that partly coincide with the findings of
Collier) as the root causes of war: stagnation and decline in real (inflation-adjusted GDP),
slow growth in food production, high income inequality, failure to adjust to chronic in-
ternational balance of goods and services deficits, a high ratio of military expenditure to
national income, competition for control of mineral exports, and a tradition of violent
conflict.
8These spillover eﬀects may include, for example, excessive flow of refugees, civil war
contagion to nearby areas, international terrorism (Collier et al.; 2003)
9According to the interdependence argument, trade decreases the motivation for con-
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conflict is peace-building, which is the main focus of this paper. We use
the same framework as Haaparanta and Kuisma (2005), which analyzes how
the possibility of trade with outside countries aﬀects the intensity of civil
conflicts in developing countries. Here we include intervention of a third
country (interpreted as the rest of the world) to a local conflict among two
countries/regions. This paper is organized such that chapter 2 begins by
presenting the framework, section 2.1 examines pre-conflict peace-building
and section 2.2 focuses on post-conflict peace-building. Chapter 3 concludes.
2 Model of conflicts and peace-building
The model analyzes the motives and actions of an outside country (coun-
tries) engaging in peace-keeping operations in the conflict zones. As in
Collier (2000), we distinguish between ex ante (pre-conflict) and ex post
(post-conflict) measures. Ex ante measures refer to action taken before the
conflict. These can include measures to reduce the eﬃciency of resources de-
voted to conflict, or the formation of safe zones by sending in peace-keeping
forces as the conflict begins to intensify. Respectively, ex post measures,
such as rebuilding the country, repairing war damages, take place after the
conflict has ceased. The economic research on peace-building and external
intervention in civil conflicts has recently received increasing attention. For
example, World Bank’s research program ”Economics of civil war, conflict
and violence” and UNU-Wider Research Project on humanitarian emergen-
cies (in collaboration with Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford) have contributed
to the understanding of the eﬀectiveness of international peace-building10.
The findings of these studies seem, however, quite contradictory. Doyle and
flict. On the other hand, trade may facilitate the financing of conflict, thus increasing the
likelihood of conflict.
10See e.g. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Doyle and Sambanis (2000) for results from
the World Bank Program and Nafziger (2004) for the UNU-Wider Program. See also
Regan (2001).
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Sambanis (2000) conclude that UN peace-keeping is positively correlated
with democratization following a civil war, and that multilateral operations
are often successful in ending the violence. On the other hand, Regan (2002)
finds that neutral third party interventions tend to lenghten the duration
of civil war. According to that study, intervention will work to shorten the
duration only if it is biased in favour of one party. Similarly, Elbadawi and
Sambanis (2000) conclude that external intervention is positively associated
with the duration of conflict. Finally, Addison and Murshed (2002) point
out that when war provides economic gains, peace is not necessarily incen-
tive compatible and peace agreements can become time inconsistent. The
role of outside agents is to enhance conflict parties’ commitment to peace.
Outside countries’ policies (commitment technologies) can thus lower the
risk of civil war reigniting.
The results from the UNU-Wider research project indicate that ex post
interventions are generally less eﬃcient than ex ante actions. The study also
shows that ex ante measures, however, should extend to long term strategies
(such as macroeconomic stabilization, structural adjustment programs and
reduction in trade barriers against low income countries) to reduce the risk
of conflicts11. In general, short term strategies (e.g. military and diplomatic
operations) are not that successful, as the willingness of the third parties to
participate is often poor and/or their policies ineﬀectual. (Nafziger, 2004).
It is important to note that a third country’s willingness to participate is
by no means certain; they must derive some utility from their involvement.
Here we pay special attention to these third country incentives. However, it
is important to note that there may be other arguments for peace-building
abroad. For example, western countries may engage in peace-building per-
ceiving peace to be an international public good. But it is important also
to understand that the familiar collective action problems are present.
11Note that the relation between trade barriers and conflict is not necessarily a straight-
forward one. See Haaparanta and Kuisma (2005).
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Recent research by Gershenson (2002) also relates to our work. Ger-
shenson examines the implications of sanctions imposed by outside parties
on civil war contestants. He examines the specific kind of sanctions whose
purpose is to influence the outcome of civil conflict in favor of challenger
(against the incumbent). Possible outcomes include deterrence, engagement
and surrender (in case the challenger is powerful enough). In short, it is
found that strong sanctions benefit the challenger, but weak sanctions can
actually hurt them. Sanctions are more likely to work when income for in-
cumbent in case of defeat is large. This could explain why sanctions were
eﬀective in the case of South Africa and Rhodesia but ineﬀective in Cuba.
Our ex ante peace-building framework is to some extent analogous to Ger-
shenson’s work. Sanctions are seen as a one measure of pre-conflict peace-
building, even though the explicit goal of sanctions is somewhat diﬀerent12.
The general framework we adopt is the following. Let us assume that
the world comprises 3 regions/countries of which regions/countries 1 and 2
engage into a mutual conflict. Country 3, representing the rest of the world,
has made a credible commitment of non-hostilily to countries 1 and 2. We
assume that countries 1 and 2 are developing countries/regions while country
3 represents the developed world. Since nowadays almost all conflicts take
place in developing regions, we postulate that the developed world does not
initiate conflict against developing regions.
The timing in the model is following: First, countries 1 and 2 invest
in arms and a war erupts. After the cease of hostilities, goods will be
exchanged in the world market with country 3 participating in the exchange.
Peace-keeping actions by the third country can take place either in the pre-
conflict phase (before the decision how much to arm), or in the post-conflict
era (when arms investments by countries 1 and 2 are already made). For
12The aim of sanctions is to support the challenger and to force the incumbent to
surrender. In our model the third country tries to prevent conflict i.e. discourage military
investment by establishing non-conflict zones or protecting existing property rights.
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analytical simplicity we abstain from production considerations and study
exchange economies only.
It is also assumed that all countries initially own only one type of en-
dowment. Hence, there are three commodities: x, y, and z. The total world
endowment of x is X and is initially owned by region 1. Respectively, the
total world endowment of y is Y and of z is Z and the first is owned by
region 2 and the latter by country 3. All sellers and buyers in the world
markets act competitively and take the world market prices as given. Let us
denote the world market price for good j by pj , where j = x, y, z. Clearly,
countries 1 and 2 engaging in conflict must devote resources to the war.
We assume that x and y are perfect substitutes in the production of arms.
The investment in conflict by country i is Wi, i = 1, 2. Accordingly, the
endowments available after arms investment are X −W1 in country 1 and
Y −W2 in country 213. For simplicity’s sake, we are ignoring the destruction
of resources during the fighting, although we acknowledge that it evidently
does occur and can rise up to significant levels.
As the war breaks out, the investments in arms result in success. We
follow Hirshleifer (199?) by modelling the consequences of the conflict in
terms of a success function. War success is determined by the following
success function φ, which determines the success of country 1. The success
of country 2 is determined by the success function 1 − φ. We refrain from
oﬀence/defence considerations and assume that military success depends
only on investments in arms as follows:
φ = φ (W1,W2) , 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, φW1 > 0, φW2 < 0 (1)
The success function can be interpreted as the probability of winning
the war and capturing the existing endowment of the other country. Equiv-
alently, as we assume that the countries decide on war investment to max-
imize the welfare of the representative agent, we simplify the analysis by
13The military build-up is assumed be financed by a lump sum tax on endowment.
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omitting all the issues related to risk aversion. Thus, assuming risk neu-
trality, the success function can be interpreted to give the available shares
of total endowments available accruing to each participant14. In our model,
after conflict the relative endowments of countries 1 and 2 of commodities x
and y are identical, post conflict endowments for country i = 1, 2 are given
by xˆi, yˆi and are: bx1 = φ(X−W1), by1 = φ(Y −W2), xˆ2 = (1−φ)(X−W1 )
and by2 = (1− φ)(Y −W2 ). The aggregate welfare levels of countries 1 and
2 are determined by the following equations15:
e (px, py, pz, u1) = φ [px (X −W1) + py (Y −W2)] , (2)
e (px, py, pz, u2) = (1− φ) [px (X −W1) + py (Y −W2)]
where e (px, py, pz, ui) denotes the expenditure function having the usual
properties (see e.g. Jehle and Reny 2001), ui = aggregate welfare in country
i. It is straightforward to see that welfare is increasing in the national share
in endowments, in net endowments and in px and py while decreasing in pz.
Country 3 welfare is similarly given by
e (px, py, pz, u3) = pzZ (3)
and is increasing in pz while it decreases with px and py.
We assume that the national utility functions are of Cobb-Douglas form,
ui = CαxiC
β
yiC
γ
zi. Consumers maximize this with respect to budget constraint
(2). From this problem we get the consumption levels Cji as a function of
prices and incomes. Cji denotes the consumption of good j in country i.
Next, we maximize the indirect utility function with respect to decisions to
armWi taking into account the success function (1), and prices to calculated
below (and given in (7)). Country 3, i.e. the rest of the world, engages
14This form of contest success function is widely used in the conflict literature. The risk
neutrality assumption is also standard, see e.g. Hirshleifer (1995; 2000).
15 It is easy to note that as ?x1?y1 =
?x2
?y2 , prospects for trade among countries 1 and 2 have
disappeared.
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in peace-building operations, either ex ante or ex post. Let S denote the
measure taken by country 3. Country 3 is assumed to act selfishly and to
maximize u3 when deciding on S. This approach seems appropriate given
e.g. the attention paid to the Middle East to ensure that energy markets
remain stable and oil prices do not increase. Accordingly, we are able to
define ψ = ψ (W1,W2, S), i.e. the aggregate income of country 1 depends
on the peace-building operations of the third country. If S is an ex ante
measure, then also Wi depends on S.
We have chosen the Cobb-Douglas presentation of national welfare lev-
els consciously to strengthen the points we make. Haaparanta and Kuisma
(2005) show that in a 3-country model with trade between exchange economies,
the extent of conflict between two of the countries increases with their in-
comes16. This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. The point here is
to show that with peace-building operations by the third country possible
one reaches a conclusion consistent with the empirical evidence.
To take action S country 3 has to spend its own resources. We make
a distinction between ex ante conflict prevention (actions taken before the
conflict has erupted) and ex post peacebuilding (e.g. reparation of war
damages). Special focus will be on the conditions under which the ex ante
peacebuilding is credible. The distinction also helps to highlight conditions
under which peacebuilding will increase conflicts.
We assume that the resource cost of action S is S. The ex ante action
is always taken before the markets open, leaving (Z − S) as the marketable
endowment of country 3. Thus, the peace-building operation will also have
an eﬀect on world market prices. If S is an ex ante peace-building measure,
then country 3 is a Stackelberg leader vis a vis countries 1 and 2, i.e. takes
into account the responses of the conflict parties. On the other hand, if S
16Haaparanta and Kuisma (2005) show that with Stone-Geary function the relationship
can be non-monotonous and consistent with empirical evidence.
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is a post-conflict action, country 3 takes the military investments as given.
In this case countries 1 and 2 act as Stackelberg leaders towards country
3. Finally, to keep the analytics as simple as possible (since we are now
studying a game with a sequence of moves) we assume throughout that
citizens everywhere have Cobb-Douglas utility functions, i.e. country i, i =
1, 2, 3 maximizes
ui = CαxiC
β
yiC
γ
zi, α+ β + γ = 1 (4)
The Cobb-Douglas specification, despite its obvious shortcomings, is widely
used in conflict literature and serves well in the current context, as the main
point is to highlight the incentives for various types of actions, and the
assumption helps to fix the focal point. In order to obtain specific results
we also use the following form of the success function:
φ =
W1
W1 +W2
(5)
This form of success function implies that there is always some military
buildup, but with diminishing returns (with buildup). The above form is
used widely in the literature, usually having parameters representing the
technology of insurgents17. These are left out in the current context, how-
ever, as the main interest is in peace-keeping operations and because the
diﬀerences in military technology are not usually decisive in intrastate con-
flicts in developing countries .
2.1 Pre-conflict peace-building
Let us first consider ex ante measures. The main focus is on measures that
(partially) protect existing property rights or establish non-conflict zones.
17This form of success function is typically used in conflict models. For example, Hirsh-
leifer (1995) uses contest success function of type p1 =
Fm1
Fm1 +F
m
2
, where p1 is the success
ratio for party 1, F1 and F2 are the fighting eﬀorts and m is a decisiveness parameter.
The decisiveness parameter has been excluded from the current discussion for analytical
simplicity.
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We postulate that the measure S taken by country 3 helps to put a share
ξiS, ξi ≥ 0, of country i’s endowment beyond the conflict, i = 1, 2.Thus, this
share is not available for contention between countries 1 and 2. We assume
that this secure endowment cannot be used for military investment either.
Accordingly, the post-conflict income for country 1 is:
ψ1 = px [ξ1S + φ (X − ξ1S −W1)] + pyφ (Y − ξ2S −W2) (6)
which leaves (X−W1) as the total supply of commodity x in the post-conflict
exchange. Analogous expressions hold for country/region 2 and commodity
y. Due to the peace-keeping investment, the total supply of commodity z is
(Z−S). This implies that the world market prices for the conflict countries’
commodities are, obtained by equating demands with supplies using the
utility functions and budget constraints:
px =
α (Z − S)
γ (X −W1)
, py =
β (Z − S)
γ (Y −W2)
. (7)
Country 1’s optimal arms building can be calculated using (6) and (7). The
problem for country 1 is:
max
W1
V (py, pzΨ1)
s.t. (8)
px [ξ1S + φ (X − ξ1S −W1)]+pyφ (Y − ξ2S −W2)−pxCx1−pyCy1−Cz1 = 0
From the above problem we get the following first order condition for country
1:
∂φ
∂W1
α (Z − S)
γ (X −W1)
∙ eX + β (X −W1)
α (Y −W2)
eY ¸− α (Z − S)
γ (X −W1)
φ+ (9)½
(1− α) ξ1S + φ
∙
(1− α) eX − βX −W1
Y −W2
eY ¸¾ α (Z − S)
γ (X −W1)2
= 0
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where eX ≡ (X−ξ1S−W1) and eY ≡ (Y −ξ2S−W2). Focusing on symmetric
equilibrium, i.e. setting X = Y, W1 =W2, condition (9) simplifies to:
∂φ/∂W1
φ
(1− γ) (X −W )
α
=
X −WeX − (10)h
(1− α) (ξS/φ) + γ eXieX
Taking into account that due to symmetry α = (1− γ) /2 and φ = 1/2,
equation (10) can be expressed in following relatively simple form:
X −W
W
=
(1− γ) (X −W )− ξS
X −W − ξS (11)
Since this is a quadratic equation it has, in general, two solutions. We
can also note that in case of no peace-building (with S = 0), the solution
becomes X−WW = (1− γ) . It is straightforward to calculate that a solution
with positive level of investment in conflict exists only if
S <
3− γ − 2 2
√
2− γ
2ξ
(12)
The upper bound is decreasing in γ. We call these levels of peace-building
imperfect, asW > 0. In other words, conflict is mitigated but not prevented.
The solution we look at is the smaller root18.
To evaluate the consequences of the peace-building action let us note
that the LHS of (11) does not depend on S. It is straightforward to see that
the RHS is smaller than (1 − γ) when S > 0. This means that military
buildup is always higher with pre-conflict peace-keeping than without it.
Furthermore, the RHS decreases with S, implying that the more extensive
the pre-conflict peace-keeping operation is, the larger will be the military
buildup. Since S and ξ have a symmetric eﬀect, we also now know that the
more intensive (bigger ξ) the peace-keeping operation is, the larger will be
the investment in arms. This gives us the first proposition.
18Since it satisfies the condition that arms building increases with γ which is the ordinary
Cobb-Douglas solution when S = 0.
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Proposition 1 Incomplete pre-conflict peace-building operations, i.e. oper-
ations with S < 3−γ−2
2√2−γ
2ξ and W > 0, will increase military buildup.
Thus, interestingly enough, ex ante peace-building operations can have
a perverse eﬀect by increasing rather than reducing the buildup of military
strength. To find out the intuition we need to examine the four eﬀects that
are present, all of which are not pointing in the same direction. First, peace-
building reduces the direct marginal benefit of the increased military invest-
ment [px (X − ξ1S −W1) + py (Y − ξ2S −W2)] ∂φ∂W1 , because the amount of
”lootable” resources as well as their prices (see price equations in (7)) are
reduced. It is easy to see that prices in Cobb-Douglas model without peace-
building would be px = αZγ(X−W1) , py =
βZ
γ(Y−W2) which are clearly higher.
Second, peace-building simultaneously reduces the direct cost of looting pxφ.
Third, peace-building reduces the terms-of-trade gain from the buildup of
arms by reducing the responsiveness of prices α(Z−S)
γ(X−W1)2
to it. Lastly, it in-
creases the base on which the gain from higher world market price (because
of the positive terms-of-trade eﬀect of conflict) applies. Peace-building op-
eration increases the amount of available goods, ceteris paribus, of which
only a proportion is spent in the home country and thus more is exported
to world markets. With Cobb-Douglas preferences the impacts increasing
incentives for arms investment are greater than the impacts working in the
opposite direction.
It must be noted that the result in Proposition 1 is only local. This is
to say that if the peace-building operation is massive enough (or eﬃcient
enough), no incentive for investing in conflict remains. To state it analyti-
cally, if S = Xξ , then property rights are perfectly protected and looting is
not profitable19, for the simple reason that there is nothing to loot. In fact,
as can be derived from condition (12), conflict can be made unprofitable
provided that the following condition holds:
19Looting still has the terms-of-trade eﬀect but it is not strong enough to make pure
destruction (”mindless” looting) profitable.
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S >
3− γ − 2 2
√
2− γ
2ξ
(13)
We call these peace-keeping operations perfect, because they completely pre-
vent conflicts. The right hand side of the above condition is decreasing in γ.
This implies that the larger the share of goods from the non-conflict region is
(in the conflicting countries), the smaller the peace-keeping operation needed
to ensure peace. This leads to an important conclusion: peace-building is
less costly in an open world. Thus we have obtained
Proposition 2 Peace can be fully ensured even without complete enforce-
ment of property rights provided that S > 3−γ−2
2√2−γ
2ξ . If peace-building
operations make endowments safe enough (secure property rights almost in
full), no conflicts arise. As S is decreasing in γ, peace-building is less costly
in an open world.
In addition to the eﬀectiveness of peace-building, it is important to con-
sider what are the incentives of country 3 to engage in peace-keeping , i.e.
why should it become involved in these costly operations20. In this paper
we exclude all altruistic considerations and assume that the third country
maximizes its own welfare only. Let us begin by considering the welfare
of country 3 by and focusing on the peace-building operation that has no
eﬀect on conflict, i.e. ∂Wi∂S = 0. In this case it is straightforward to calculate
that ∂u3∂S = −γ, which clearly is negative. This is to say that peace-building
without any eﬀect on conflict reduces the welfare of the peace-building coun-
try unambiguously21. Under the conditions of Proposition 1 we know that
in this model ∂Wi∂S > 0, i.e. military build-up is increased by incomplete
20This point was left out by Gershenson (2002) who does not consider motives of an
outside for peace-keeping.
21This also substantiates the claim made above that pure looting (destruction of one’s
own endowments without any gain) for manipulation of terms-of-trade is not beneficial
for countries 1 and 2.
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peace-building operations. This implies that small-scale peace-building op-
erations (with S < 3−γ−2
2√2−γ
2ξ ) will definitely reduce welfare even more than
completely ineﬀective peace-building operations (those with ξ = 0), since
they will also deteriorate the terms-of-trade of the peace-building country.
Therefore, it is clear that there are no incentives for country 3 to engage in
incomplete peace-building operations.
We are then left with perfect peace-building operations. We know that
the indirect welfare of country 3 is proportional to (px)−α (py)−β Z, which
can in general be written as
³
α
γ
´−α ³β
γ
´−β ³
Z−S
X−W1
´−α ³
Z−S
Y−W2
´−β
Z. In the
symmetric case without peace-building this is equal to
³
α
γ
´−2α h
(1−γ)X
2−γ
i2α
Zγ
where α = 1−γ2 . With perfect peace-keeping in symmetric equilibrium, it
equals
³
α
γ
´−2α
X2α (Z − S)γ . It is easy to see that perfect peace-building is
beneficial if the resource requirement for it satisfies the condition:
S <
[f (γ)− 1]Z
f (γ)
, where f (γ) ≡
µ
2− γ
1− γ
¶1−γ
γ
. (14)
Combining (12) and (14) and noticing also that the feasibility condition S ≤
X
ξ must hold, it turns out that perfect peace-building increases the welfare
of country 3 if 3−γ−2
2√2−γ
2ξ < S < min
n
X
ξ ,
[f(γ)−1]Z
f(γ)
o
Proposition 3 Outside countries are more likely to eliminate conflict per-
fectly the more eﬃcient the peace-building operations are (ξ high), and the
more dependent the consumer welfare is on goods supplied by the non-conflict
countries (γ large). Perfect peace-building is also more likely the richer the
non-conflict countries are. Poor non-conflict countries will not engage in
pre-conflict peace-building. Perfect peace-building requires that conflicting
countries’ income is high enough, i.e. X > ξS.
Proposition 3 can be used to highlight several issues. First, as such it
provides an explanation for peace-building conducted by outside countries.
This holds especially for wealthy outside countries. It also shows that the
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attempts of poor outside countries to build peace are likely to fail, i.e. they
cannot provide enough resources for the operations to be successful. This
is the recent experience in Africa (Andreatta et. al., 2000), where peace-
building operations have been allocated to smaller countries without the
burden not being shared by all African countries.
One must also consider the fact that in reality there is not only one
single outside country but a large number of them. Proposition 3 tells
that as a they group have an incentive to engage in ex ante peace-bulding.
However, due to well-known Olsonian collective action problems, they may
not be able to coordinate the process. One way for them to coordinate their
decisions and commit to the peace-building process is to establish separate
peace-keeping organizations with clearly defined national contributions to
ensure the financial viability of these organizations. Perhaps one way to
understand UN role and current EU plans to establish joint peace-building
forces is exactly this.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 3 is that perfect peace-
building is not feasible in the poorest countries (i.e. if X is small). The
intuition is that if conflicting countries are very poor, there is not much
resources for the trade anyhow, and thus no incentives for the third country
to be involved. Again referring to the African experience it may be a reason
why the conflicts there seem to be hard to mitigate. Interestingly, Doyle and
Sambanis (2000) have found that an index of the level of development has a
positive impact on the success of peace-building processes: The higher the
index the higher the probability of success. Their index contains the level
of GDP of the region in conflict as one building block. It is also important
to note that unless pre-conflict peace-building operations are controlled for,
an empirical study on conflicts shows that an increase in national income
of the conflicting country decreases the probability of conflict (Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 2000). Since peace building seems to be more eﬀective the more
developed the country is, it may be suggested that at least part of the eﬀect
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that investment in conflict decreases as income increases comes through
peace-building22.
There are many other means of pre-conflict peace-building than just
establishing conflict-free zones or securing property rights (Collier, 2000;
Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and Nafziger, 2004 give examples). For example,
the eﬃciency of arms investment in conflict areas can be directly reduced
by employing the peace-keeping forces with superior weaponry. This can
be analyzed e.g. by specifying that the eﬀective arms investment with a
gross outlay of Wi is just (1− νiS)Wi. It is straightforward to see that this
reduces incentives to invest in arms and thus mitigates conflict even for small
investment in peace-keeping. This eﬀect also provides incentives for outside
countries actually to engage in the operation. One interesting possibility
is that arms investments require as inputs all the goods, but there is some
substitutability. With this specification one can analyze arms embargoes
and such type of policies. This, however, requires some modifications to the
model and is excluded from the present discussion.
2.2 Post-conflict peace-building
Let us next move on to post-conflict peace-building. Although pre-conflict
peace-keeping would be superior so as to avoid both human casualties and
material damages, unfortunately pre-conflict peace-keeping operations of-
ten fail and post-conflict measures are needed. We analyze two types of
post-conflict peace-keeping operations. First we look at policies that try
to re-establish the pre-conflict property rights (e.g borders between coun-
tries/regions) on the endowments now partly destroyed by the war. Sec-
ondly, we consider policies that repair war damages. Repairing war damages
could mean for example direct transfers to the people impoverished by the
22 It must be noted that peace-building also makes the Cobb-Douglas function consis-
tent with the empirical evidence when discussing on the problem how possibilities for
international trade aﬀect conflicts (see Haaparanta and Kuisma, 2005).
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war or clearing up of mine-fields after the conflict.
2.2.1 Reestablishment of property rights
Consider country 1 in the post-conflict situation. It now owns share φ of all
the post-conflict resources in countries 1 and 2. In particular, after conflict
it owns only share φ of the resource X it owned initially completely. Let
us assume that a policy S chosen by country 3 distributes back a share λS,
λ > 0 from the resource looted by country 2. Country 1’s post conflict
share of X thus becomes φ + λS (1− φ) which is equivalent to (1− λS)φ
+ λS. Obviously, at the same time it looses partly its share in resource Y
by getting to own share (1− λS)φ. Thus, country 1’s total post-conflict
income including the peace-keeping eﬀect is:
ψ = px [(1− λS)φ+ λS] (X −W1) + py (1− λS)φ (Y −W2) (15)
Since the total post-conflict endowments of x and y do not depend on the
peace-keeping operation, the world market prices are given by (7). The first
order condition for the military investment by country 1 can be written
(after a slight manipulation) in the following simple form:
(1− λS) (1− γ) ∂φ
∂W1
− [(1− γ) (1− λS)φ+ αλS] α
X −W1
= 0 (16)
We focus again on the symmetric equilibrium assuming that X = Y and
W1 =W2. From (16) one can directly calculate that the investment in arms
in symmetric case is:
W =
X
1 + g (S)
, g (S) ≡ (1− γ)
µ
1 +
λS
1 + λS
¶
(17)
It is clear that investment is definitely smaller than it would be without
the peace-keeping operation; we may recall that the solution in symmetric
Cobb-Douglas case without peace-keeping operations is W = X(2−γ) which is
always higher than the above solution. The arms investment decreases when
the operation becomes more extensive, i.e. when S grows. The intuition is
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straightforward: incentives to conflict diminish because reestablishment of
property rights reduces the catch one can get through the conflict. This
holds for both one’s own endowment and the foreign endowment.
The problem with this policy is that country 3 does not have any in-
centive to exercise it ex post. From country 3’s point of view peace-keeping
just uses its resources which are redistributed to conflicting countries and
does not change the amount (increase) them. Evidently, this improves its
terms-of-trade, but as was argued above, terms-of-trade manipulation via
destruction of own resources is never beneficial. Hence, this policy is not
credible in the post-conflict situation.
Viewed from the pre-conflict situation the policy may be beneficial be-
cause it will increase the supply of x and y in the post-conflict exchange, as
conflict investment is decreased. It is easy to show that in the symmetric
equilibrium:
∂u3
∂S
= −γ − 2α
µ
Z − S
X −W
¶
∂W
∂S
. (18)
Evaluated at S = 0 the above equation becomes:
∂u3
∂S S=0
= −γ + λ (1− γ) (2− γ)Z
X
(19)
which is positive if
Z
X
>
γ
λ (1− γ) (2− γ) (20)
We have now established the following result
Proposition 4 Post-conflict restoration of property rights is not a time-
consistent policy without pre-commmitment, because the third country does
not have any incentive to exercise that policy ex post. However, by commit-
ting to the policy ex ante it is beneficial for third country if ZX >
γ
λ(1−γ)(2−γ) .
Proposition 3 together with Proposition 4 highlights the importance of
commitment to peace-keeping actions, if the actions protect property rights.
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They both underline the incentives of rich countries to provide eﬃcient
peace-keeping. Ex ante commitment to post-conflict peace-building is ben-
eficial if the outside country (countries) are rich enough compared to the
conflicting countries, but it is important that outside countries commit to
the policy beforehand. That way they are able to increase the post-conflict
amounts of x and y, as the commitment to restore property rights decreases
the conflict investments of countries 1 and 2. It is important to note that ex
post the restoration of property rights only uses outside country’s resources
and is not profitable. For poor outside countries it is not advantageous to
use their own resources at all to make more x and y available after conflict.
2.2.2 Reparation of war damages
Typically in civil conflicts, war damages can become severe while the re-
sources available to consumption and production are low. The reparation of
war damages can be one means of post-conflict peace-building. When war
damages are repaired, it eﬀectively means that some of the resources that
were destroyed during the war will become available again for market ex-
change after the conflict. There are two ways postulate this, both of which
lead to equivalent formulations. Let us begin by assuming that the authori-
ties of the conflicting countries cannot use the future anticipated reparation
payments to finance the military investment. In other words, they will only
get a share of the destroyed resources back after the conflict. We also as-
sume that countries get war damages paid in proportion of the post-conflict
endowments, which means that country 1’s post-conflict income is:
φ [px ((X −W1) + ϕ1SW1) + py ((Y −W2) + ϕ2SW2)] (21)
where ϕiS, is the share of war damages repaired such that ϕi > 0, 0 ≤ S ≤ 1ϕ .
Similar expression holds for country 2.
The other possibility is to assume that the authorities can ”borrow”
against the war reparation payments. In this case we can capture the ef-
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fects of peace-keeping action by setting (1− ϕiS)Wi to be the damage after
reparation. Country 1’s post-conflict income in this case is:
φ [px (X − (1− ϕ1S)W1) + py ((Y − (1− ϕ2S)W2))] (22)
It is obvious that the two cases are identical. The first order condition for
the military investment by country 1 is now:
∂φ
∂W1
− φα
µ
1− ϕ1S
X − cW1
¶
= 0, where cW1 ≡ (1− ϕ1S)W1 (23)
In the symmetric case this gives the solution:
W =
X
2− γ − ϕS (24)
This implies immediately that war reparations will increase the intensity of
military conflict. The intuition is straightforward: war reparations, when
anticipated, reduce the marginal cost of arms build-up, since the eﬀective en-
dowments are not reduced by the full amount of investment in arms23. One
might expect that country 3 would never want to commit to war reparations
policy before the conflict. But, it turns out to be a time consistent policy.
Country 3 has incentive to war reparations after the conflict, provided that it
is rich enough. The impact of a marginal increase in peace-keeping expense
on country 3 welfare can be expressed as:
∂u3
∂S
= −γ + 2α (Z − S)ϕW
X − (1− ϕS)W
When this is evaluated at S = 0, the condition for there to exist an incentive
for country 3 to run the peace-keeping operation becomes:
Z >
γ
ϕ
23This is somewhat a similar problem as with foreign aid to conflicting countries. Due
to the fungibility of aid, it can be used to peaceful or warlike purposes. Thus, foreign
aid or debt relief to conflicting countries may, in fact, increase military investments. See
Addison and Murshed (2003).
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Hence, once again, if the outside country is rich enough it has an incentive to
secure peace in conflicting countries. It is noteworthy that the requirement is
more tighter the smaller is the size of the operation and the more important
good z is in consumption. We have now established
Proposition 5 Repairing war damages is a time consistent policy for a rich
enough non-conflict country. As a tool to mitigate conflicts it is counterpro-
ductive, since it increases military investments.
The intuition is that war reparations increase the supply of goods im-
ported by the non-conflict country. Thus, the policy improves its terms of
trade both directly and indirectly. The problem with this policy is that if
conflicting countries see that country 3 finds the post-conflict reparations
advantageous, they will obviously increase their conflict investments. If a
country 3 could credibly tie its hands so that conflicting countries would
not expect these kind of operations, the magnitude of conflict would be
decreased.
Proposition 5 and Proposition 4 point out some diﬃculties in peace-
keeping. Outside countries (if rich enough) have an incentive to secure
peace by securing the conflicting parties’ initial property rights. Proposi-
tion 4 shows that this works perfectly if it is the only policy used and if
policy measures are announced ex ante. Proposition 5, however, tells that
it is not the only policy that the outside countries engage in, as the ex post
reparation of war damages can be profitable for them too. As long as the
initial endowments are not completely secured, though, conflicting countries
have an incentive to invest in arms, since war reparations expand the re-
sources they can use in the conflict. Non-conflicting countries can prevent
this by extending the protection of property rights before the conflict beyond
those stated in Proposition 4.
22
3 Conclusions
This paper has focused on the peace-building by outside countries in lo-
cal conflicts in the third world. The issue is extremely important, since
presently almost all conflicts take place in developing countries and it seems
highly probable that conflicts are a significant factor prohibiting growth and
development in these regions. Furthermore, the detrimental consequences
of civil wars are not restricted to the areas in war, but conflicts often aﬀect
neighboring regions too. Our work aims to contribute to the understanding
of the role of the external countries from economic standpoint. The model
used in this paper is an extension of the basic model of international trade
and conflicts to a three-country world. We have argued that the intensity
of conflicts can decline when the conflicting country’s income increases if
peace building is taken into account. This provides a new, and complemen-
tary to other explanations, explanation for the empirical observation that
the relationship between conflicts and income levels is non-monotonous. We
also found that incomplete pre-conflict peace-building operations will in-
crease military buildup. Successful pre-conflict peace-building requires that
the outside countries are suﬃciently rich, and that the conflicting countries
also have a high enough income (which conforms with the existing empirical
evidence). Finally, it turns out that post-conflict re-establishment of prop-
erty rights is not time-consistent unless the peacebuilding countries are rich
enough. Repairing war damages is counterproductive as it increases military
investments if announced in advance.
In our framework the outside countries have an incentive to either ex
ante or ex post peacebuilding purely from selfish interests. These interests
do not always help to mitigate conflicts but can do so (in case of ex ante
peacebuilding). The incentives work through terms of trade, peacebuilding
keeps the supplies of imported goods at higher level. In this we have man-
aged to formalise the notion that concern for supplies of some goods may
dictate foreign policy actions. At the same time the model may help to
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understand why peacekeeping by poor countries may not be eﬀective.
The model we have used omits many important aspects relevant for
conflicts. The extension to include production (like in Becsi and Lahiri 2005)
would be quite straightforward. Inclusion of uncertainty and organisation
of conflict activities, like e.g. modelling of political conflict and organisation
of guerilla groups, would certainly add much to the analysis and should be
taken into account in future research.
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3.1 Appendix
The first order condition (9) is generated by maximizing the indirect utility
function V (pi,Ψi) where i = 1, 2. We obtain this function by maximizing
ui = CαxiC
β
yiC
γ
zi, with respect to budget constraint. From this problem we get
the consumption levels Cji as a function of prices and incomes. Cji denotes
the consumption of good j in country i. Next, we maximize the indirect
utility function with respect to arming decisions Wi taking into account the
success function (1), budget equation (2) and prices (7). The problem for
country 1 is:
max
W1
V (py, pz,Ψ1)
s.t. (25)
px [ξ1S + φ (X − ξ1S −W1)]+pyφ (Y − ξ2S −W2)−pxCx1−pyCy1−Cz1 = 0
Using the envelope theorem the first order condition for this problems
can be written as equation (8) in the text.
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